Delaying Integration of Immigrant Labor for the Purpose of Taxation by Wolfram F. Richter
DELAYING INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT LABOR
FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAXATION
WOLFRAM F. RICHTER
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 802
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE
OCTOBER 2002
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 802
DELAYING INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANT
LABOR FOR THE PURPOSE OF TAXATION
Abstract
Delayed Integration ("DI") is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that
immigrants be taxed in the receiving country only after some period of transition.
Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay home taxes only
after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the
Origin Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor while a
close substitute to the latter - the Nationality Principle - is underlying U.S. tax
law. The paper studies the potential merits of DI in a setting which allows one to
trade off the social cost of tax distortion and the social cost of wasteful
government.








One of the cornerstones shaping the OECD Model Tax Convention is the Employment
Principle ("EP"). A person earning income from employment or personal services
pays taxes in the country in which the activity is undertaken even if the person resides
in a different country. At least this is the general rule. Deviating specific rules may
apply in cases of posted or frontier workers or if services are rendered to governments.
This paper questions the practice of relying on EP in international taxation and it offers
a discussion of the alternatives. 
The specific feature of EP is that it provides strong incentives for choosing
employment where taxes are low. This has advantageous as well as disadvantageous
implications. The orthodox theory of international taxation focuses on the latter. Its
advocates, standing in the tradition of welfare economics, stress the efficiency cost of
non-harmonized taxation. Labor will be inefficiently allocated if earned income is
taxed differently at different places. The orthodox approach to taxation is closely
connected to the view of governments acting as benevolent maximizers of social
welfare. This approach has been criticized by those economists viewing tax authorities
more in the role of a Leviathan pursuing its own objectives and wasting tax revenue.
The most prominent reference is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). These economists
stress the merits of competition among institutions, in general, and among countries, in
particular. According to Brennan and Buchanan (1980, p. 186), tax competition among
separate jurisdictions is an objective to be sought in its own right.3
Hence, the conclusion to be drawn from the literature
1 is that tax competition produces
costs and benefits. The costs come from tax distortion and increase if individuals are
allowed to avoid paying taxes by switching their place of employment. The benefits
result from the efficiency enhancing effect of competition. Competition among tax
authorities is a mechanism constraining the waste of tax revenue.
There have been attempts by Edwards and Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000) to model
the trade off between the costs and benefits of tax competition and to work out an
optimal solution. The attempts must be considered to be disappointing for all those
expecting clear-cut results. There is obviously no general rule saying that the costs of
tax competition exceed the benefits or vice versa. As one may well expect, it all
depends on behavioral parameters. A typical result is that of Edwards and Keen (1996)
derived for a setting in which mobile capital is taxed by a small jurisdiction. Tax
competition is costly on balance if the elasticity of the mobile tax base exceeds the
Leviathan's marginal propensity to waste tax revenue.
With such a result in mind, it is not clear how one should assess EP as one of the
cornerstones of the OECD Model Tax Convention. On the one hand, EP must be
viewed as the cause of distortions in taxpayers' locational choices. On the other hand,
it enables effective tax competition which promises to tame Leviathan governments.
Assessing EP is, therefore, not easy. However, it is not least a question of alternatives.
A conceivable alternative is suggested by the practice of the United States not to
release its citizens from the obligation to pay home taxes while residing abroad. This is
the so-called Nationality Principle. U.S. citizens cannot escape home taxes just by
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moving abroad. The United States only grant its citizens relief from double taxation.
Foreign paid income tax is credited - up to certain limitations - against U.S. tax. The
problem with the Nationality Principle is that it is politically not acceptable for
Europe. It deeply conflicts with the widely agreed objective of overcoming
nationalistic tendencies in international relations. In this very spirit, Article 12 of the
EU Treaty forbids the Member States of the European Union to discriminate on
grounds of nationality. On the other hand, one need not rely on the Nationality
Principle explicitly if one would only like to reap the economic benefits which its
implementation promises. From an economics' point of view, there is an almost perfect
substitute for the Nationality Principle and it has been advocated under the name of the
Home-Country Principle by Sinn in various writings. See a.o. Sinn (1994). This
principle is also called the Origin Principle ("OP") and it is this terminology which
will be used in the following discussion. Sinn pleaded for its adoption with a particular
conception of the welfare state. The primary function of the welfare state would be to
provide insurance against income risks and uncertain life careers. What appears ex
post to be redistribution is insurance from an ex ante point of view. Whenever
individuals are allowed to switch insurance freely ex post, there is the risk of adverse
selection. This would weaken the ex ante insurance function which the welfare state is
expected to provide. According to Sinn, individuals should therefore only be free to
choose between competing redistributive systems ex ante when young and ignorant
about career perspectives. The redistributive system they choose then defines the
country of origin, or the home country. Switching the country of origin ex post should
not be allowed. Sinn rejects EP not only because it distorts migration decisions, but,
above all, because it undermines the insurance function of the welfare state. 5
Still, the case for OP is not that clear. The reason is the same one that causes
reluctance to denounce any tax competition. By minimizing the cost of tax distortion,
OP only eases the wasting of tax revenue. Taxpayers become exploitable when they
cannot avoid home taxes by emigrating. On the other hand, OP is not the only
conceivable alternative to EP. In a sense which still has to be made precise, it is just an
extreme alternative and there are less extreme ones which promise reduced costs of tax
distortion without fully unleashing the Leviathan. Such a solution has recently been
proposed by the Council of Economic Advisors to the German Ministry of Finance
(2001) for the task of coordinating Europe's decentralized policies in the field of social
security. The Council coined the name of Delayed Integration ("DI"). DI means that
migrants remain assigned to their country of origin for fiscal purposes for an agreed
period of time after emigrating. Only after this period has elapsed does the country of
immigration take over the fiscal competence for these particular persons. The concept
is not completely novel. Vestiges of it can be found here and there in social policy
legislation and foreign tax codes. An example of the former was California's practice
of limiting new residents for the duration of one year to the benefits they would have
received in the State of their prior residence.
2 An example for the latter is Germany's
practice of keeping emigrants subjected to German taxation on that part of their
income that originates in Germany for a period of five years if they move to a low
income jurisdiction. A similar rule applies to U.S. expatriates. Emigrants form the
United States remain subjected to U.S. tax law for a period of ten years after losing
U.S. citizenship. The systematic application of DI in international policy coordination,
however, has only recently attracted particular attention (Sakslin, 1997; Weichen
                                             
2 The durational residency requirements of California have been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.6
rieder, 2000; Richter, 2002a and 2002b). What is still lacking is a thorough analysis of
the potential merits of DI. It must be considered an open question of why and when
one should give preference to DI when EP or OP are the alternatives. This is where the
present paper ties in. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the simple model of a small
open economy. The model allows one to separate the social costs of tax distortion and
of wasteful government in the succeeding sections. Section 3 looks at a country of
immigration and Section 4 at one of emigration. It is shown in both cases that the
policy of implementing DI dominates OP whenever the Leviathan's propensity to
waste tax revenue is sufficiently strong. No such clear-cut result will, however, be
derived for the comparison of DI and EP. In any case, the Leviathan turns out to be
less powerful if it is forced to target the political support of natives and not that of
taxpayers. Furthermore, the Leviathan enjoys more power under conditions of
immigration. Section 5 summarizes, makes qualifications and draws some conclusions. 
2. A simple model
Consider a small open economy the production  ) (L F  of which only varies with
mobile labor L . Marginal productivity is positive and decreasing,  " 0 ' F F > > . Primes
indicate the derivatives of functions throughout. A decreasing marginal product can be
justified by the existence of a hidden fixed factor. In this paper, the fixed factor is
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interpreted as immobile labor. The implicit assumption is that mobility is an innate
ability.
Production output is an all-purpose private good serving as numéraire. There is an
additional good G which is interpreted as a public good and which is consumed by
immobile labor only. The utility derived is V(G) with marginal increments which are
positive and decreasing, V' > 0 > V''. The public good is provided by a Leviathan
government. The cost of provision is 1+c per unit. The parameter c > 0 is a measure of
the Leviathan's marginal propensity to waste tax revenue. From a positive point of
view, C = cG is some overhead cost of provision. The assumption, however, is that it
is not an unavoidable cost. It is expenditure benefiting the Leviathan only. For mobile
and immobile labor, it is pure waste preventing the public sector from producing at its
efficiency frontier. For the sake of simplicity, such waste is assumed to be strictly
proportional in G. This represents a slight difference to Edwards and Keen (1996) and
Rauscher (2000), who model the structure of public expenditures as an endogenous
decision. Proportionality of waste, though, is not the only simplification adopted for
the following analysis. The standard framework of the literature is further simplified
with respect to the Leviathan's objective function, which will be additive between its
own consumption, C, and the utilitarian welfare of labor, U. The idea is that the
Leviathan has to trade off its own consumption against the public support for its
administration and that both objectives are perfectly substitutable. Hence, the
Leviathan maximizes C + U. Additionally, income effects of the private demand for
the public good are ruled out by assuming U(G,X) = V(G) + X  to be quasi-linear in G
and aggregate private consumption X. The latter equals labor income after tax. The8
precise definition of X requires some careful thought and can only be given after
specifying taxation.
Taxation is chosen to be redistributive in favor of immobile labor. Such a distributive
bias is justified by the robust empirical observation that mobility is skill driven and
that skill and income are positively correlated. This makes non-skilled immobile labor
the natural target of distributive policy. Redistribution is designed in the most simple
way. It is assumed that immobile labor does not have to pay non-zero taxes although it
is the only group of individuals deriving utility from the public good G. Hence, private
consumption of immobile labor equals gross income F(L)-wL, with w denoting the
cost of mobile labor. Perfect competition in the labor market ensures that wage costs
equal marginal productivity, w = F'(L) . The gross wage paid to mobile labor abroad is
* w . As the focus is on a small country,  * w  is treated as an exogenous parameter. In
what follows, an asterix * indicates a foreign parameter.
As already mentioned, positive taxes are paid by mobile labor only. In order to specify
the exact amount of taxes, the home country's perspective is adopted. If mobile labor
originating from home is employed at home, it pays taxes t per unit. Migrants are
taxed differently, however. They are taxed according to a formula which is flexible
enough to cover some interesting cases. Let us focus on labor immigrating to the home
country. As immigrants they pay taxes  t i) 1 ( δ −  to the home country.  i δ  can be
interpreted as a rebate granted by the home country to immigrants on their tax liability.
The way the rebate has been introduced into the political discussion by Council of
Economic Advisors (2001), however, suggests interpreting  i δ  not as an explicit rebate
but as an implicit rebate granted in the form of a temporary delay in tax liability.9
Although the present model is a static one, such a dynamic interpretation of  i δ  is
straightforward. For instance, if  i δ  equals zero, there is no delay granted and
immigrants are liable to pay full taxes to the home country from the very moment they
get employed in the home country. This amounts to taxing according to EP as
suggested by the OECD Model Tax Convention. If  i δ  is chosen to equal one,
immigrants do not have to pay taxes to the home country. For tax purposes they are
treated as non-existent. It is as if their integration were delayed to infinity. In what
follows, the term of Delayed Integration ("DI") will, however, be used only if  i δ  is
strictly between zero and one.
Immigrants to the home country are emigrants from abroad. The logic of DI requires
them to remain subjected to tax liability abroad for some time. Let  * *t e δ  be the tax
emigrants from abroad pay abroad. Hence, when migrating to the home country their
overall tax liability amounts to  * * ) 1 ( t t e i δ δ+ − . Interpret  *
e δ  as the delay chosen
abroad for releasing emigrants from the obligation to pay taxes abroad. If  *
e δ  equals
one, the emigrant is never released from paying taxes abroad, as suggested by OP. If
*
e δ  equals zero, the emigrant stops paying taxes abroad at the very moment she
emigrates. A priori, one cannot rule out the possibility that a country finds it optimal to
treat immigrants and emigrants non-symmetrically. As to the home country, this would
mean that the delay in integration,  i δ , comes to differ from the delay in releasing
emigrants from the obligation to pay home taxes,  e δ . Non-harmonized parameters of
delay in the countries of immigration and emigration would, however, result either in
double taxation or in a temporary exemption from taxation. Both cases are10
problematic. An obvious objective of international tax coordination should therefore
be the equalization of delays,  δ δ δ δ δ≡ = = = * *
e i e i . In this special case, the tax
liability of migrants shows up as the convex combination of home and foreign tax
rates. This property allows one to interpret DI as a convex combination of EP and OP
and the latter principles as polar.
Mobile labor is assumed not to consume the public good G. Hence, it makes sense to
model the migration decision of mobile labor by pure net-wage arbitrage. If migration
is from abroad to home, arbitrage is between 
* * t w −  and  * * ) 1 ( t t w e i δ δ− − − . An
equilibrium is reached if  * * * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( t w t w e i δ δ− − = − − . Symmetrically, if mobile
labor emigrates from the home country, arbitrage is between  t w−  and
t t w e i δ δ− − − * * * ) 1 ( . In this case, an equilibrium is reached if
* * * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( t w t w i e δ δ − − = − − . Both cases are covered by the joint equilibrium
condition
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' * *
o δ δ− − = − − • w t L F * t (1•)
with appropriate choices of dots (•,o) = (i,e) or (e,i), respectively.
Tax revenue is used to finance government expenditure. In stating the condition of
budget balance, one has to differentiate again between immigration and emigration.
Let L  denote the initial endowment of mobile labor in the home country. For the sake
of brevity, it is said to be mobile native labor. Immigration to the home country
prevails if mobile labor employed exceeds native labor,  L L < , and if mobile native
labor has no incentive to emigrate. The latter is ensured if (1e) holds with "≥"11
substituted for "=". Given immigration to the home country, the government budget is
balanced if 
[ ] ) )( 1 ( L L L t i − δ − +    =   (1+c)G .( 2 i)
Mutatis mutandis, emigration is characterized by L  > L, by a condition of balanced
budget
[ ] ) ( L L L t e − δ +    =   (1+c)G ,( 2 e)
and by some (1i) with "≤" substituted for "=".
The description of the model is finished by defining the home country's aggregate
private consumption. In doing so, it is important to differentiate between two
conceptions. One is taxpayers' consumption and the other is natives' consumption. In
order to derive private consumption, one has to add up the incomes after tax that
accrue to the various suppliers of labor. In the case of taxpayers' consumption, this is
income of immobile labor, F(L)-F'(L)L, income of mobile natives, (F'(L)-t)L , and
income accruing to immigrants, though only to the amount that they are taxpayers in
the home country,  ) )( 1 )( ' ( L L t F i − − −δ . Adding up these terms and making use of (2i)
yields 
) ( ' ) ( ) ( L F L L L F X i
T
i − δ − =  - (1+c)G .( 3 i)
By similar reasoning, taxpayers' private consumption adds up to 
* ) ( ) ( w L L L F X e
T
e − δ + =  - (1+c)G  (3e)
if labor is emigrating from home. Note that immobile labor income is subsumed under
taxpayers' income although it is not liable to pay positive tax. This makes sense as12
immobile labor is affected by budget policy via public expenditures and it is only for
the sake of simplicity that it is assumed to pay zero tax.
The competing conception is natives' consumption. It is obtained by adding up the
incomes after tax accruing to natives. In the case of immigration, this is income earned
by immobile labor, F(L)-F'(L)L, and income earned by mobile natives, (F'(L)-t)L .
Summing yields 
L t L F L L L F X
N
i − − − = ) ( ' ) ( ) ( .( 4 i)
Mutatis mutandis, natives' consumption is
) ) 1 ( )( ( ) (
* * * t w L L L F X i
N
e δ − − − + =  - (1+c)G (4e)
in the case of emigration. Below, natives will be the reference for welfare
comparisons. Natives are, however, not necessarily the individuals whose political
support the Leviathan can be assumed to seek. Neither are taxpayers. If anything, a
Leviathan government will seek the support of voters and it is the question in the
modeling whether voters should be assumed to be natives or taxpayers. Arguments can
be found for both.
Internationally, the common rule is that voting rights are tied to citizenship and not to
the status of paying taxes. On the other hand, citizens of the European Union are
granted the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections and
elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which these citizens
reside. This proves that the Union is well on its way to separating voting rights from
national citizenship and to linking them to residence, which for present purposes can
be interpreted as a good proxy for the liability to pay income tax. From a constitutional13
point of view, denying immigrants the right to vote is an institutional constraint
requiring justification in its own right. Without such a constraint, one would expect
individuals to vote where they pay taxes and/or consume local public goods. Hence, it
is not really clear whose support a Leviathan government should be assumed to seek if
such an assumption is to be well justified in positive analysis. There are good reasons
for equating the electorate with natives and there are equally good reasons for equating
the electorate with taxpayers. Therefore, both alternatives will be discussed below. By
doing so, some light is shed on the effect that constraining voting rights to natives has
on Leviathan behavior.
3
3. Optimal delay in the case of immigration
Consider the task of fixing rules of international taxation in some kind of
constitutional assembly. An answer is then required to the question of which delay
natives should choose for taxing migrant labor anticipating that future governments
have a propensity to waste tax revenue. This is a normative question with a flavor of
public choice. It is best stated in terms of principal and agent. The native population
serves as the principal and the Leviathan government as the agent. Such a conception
suggests starting the analysis by first solving the agent's problem. For this purpose, we
differentiate between immigration and emigration and we start by analyzing the
former.
                                             
3 Michel et al. (1998) study the effect that some delayed granting of citizenship has on distributive policy. In
contrast to the model of the present paper, they assume low-skilled labor to be mobile. See also Razin and Sadka
(2001, Sect. 6).14
3.1 Taxpayers' support
Assuming first that the Leviathan government seeks the support of taxpayers, the
government can be assumed to maximize cG + V(G) + 
T
i X  in G, t, L subject to  L L ≤ ,
(1i), (2i), and (3i). Restrict consideration to interior solutions,  L L < , and assume that
in the optimum, home labor cannot gain from emigrating,
* * * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' t w t L F i e δ − − > δ − − . Then solve for the resulting standard Lagrangean
optimization parameterized by  i δ . It is straightforward to show that optimal
government choices of G, t, L solve (1i), (2i), and
" ) ' 1 ( GF V −   =   " ) ( ) 1 ( )
1
1 '
' ( ) 1 (
2 F L L t
c
V
t F t i i i − δ − δ −
+
−
+ δ −  . (5)
A first noteworthy result is that  i δ =1 implies V'=1. The latter condition characterizes
efficient consumption of the public good while  i δ =1 stands for a regime in which
immigrants are not taxed as required by OP. Efficient consumption of public goods
may not be what one would expect to result from Leviathan activity. Still, it makes
sense in the present model. The Leviathan has no reason to deviate from the first-best
level of G because from its perspective, there is no efficiency cost of taxation.
Immigrants are not taxed anyway and the tax on mobile natives is infra-marginal.
Quasi-linearity of the utilitarian welfare function ensures that Leviathan activity has
some private income effect only. The level of taxation chosen by the Leviathan is too
high, but the level of public good consumption is at its first best. 
Unfortunately, things are more complicated if  1 ≠ δi  . Differentiating (1i), (2i), and (5)
implicitly and solving for G',L' and t' as functions of  i δ  produces some complex15
expressions, the interpretation of which is anything but straightforward. However,
letting  i δ  tend to one yields the following limit expressions:
G'  =  -t(L-L )/GV"  >  0 , (6)
L'  =  -t/F"  >  0 . (7)





− )/L >  0 . (8)
It is suggestive to address the case of some  i δ  close to one as one of "large delay".
This allows one to interpret (6) - (8) as follows. If the chosen delay is already large,
increasing it even more and marginally will have the following effects. The provision
of the public good G will increase and reach the level of first-best consumption in the
limit. Immigration,  L L − , will equally increase till it reaches the nationally efficient
level characterized by  t w L F e) 1 ( ) ( '
* * δ − − = . Finally, the tax t increases till it reaches
a local maximum at  i δ =1. Note that the Leviathan's propensity to waste tax revenue, c,
only impacts the change in t. The more wasteful the Leviathan is, the more taxation
will increase along with  i δ 1 → . It is also interesting to note that G' and t' are both
proportional in L-L . The Leviathan's power to exploit taxpayers obviously benefits
from immigration. All these effects would hardly be so clear-cut if the Leviathan's
objective function were not additive in its own consumption and taxpayers' welfare
and if the latter would fail to be quasi-linear. However, the identified effects are all
very plausible.
At the constitutional level, the problem is to choose the parameter of delay  i δ  given
the behavioral reactions as defined implicitly by (1i), (2i),and (5). One would like to16
answer the following two questions. First, is there good reason to choose  i δ ) 1 , 0 ( ∈  and
to institute DI? Second, if not, should one give preference to  i δ =0 (EP) or better to
i δ =1 (OP)? Unfortunately, clear-cut results are out of reach and this has to be
explained. 
A priori, one might speculate that aggregate welfare of natives, 
N
i i i X G V W + δ = δ )) ( ( ) ( () ( ), ( ), ( i i i L t G δ δ δ ) ,
is maximized by some interior  i δ ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ . The necessary condition for this to hold is 
L t L F L L G V W ' ' " ) ( ' ' ' 0
!
− − − = = (9)
    {
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
' ' ' ) 1 ( ' ' " ) ( ' ) 1 ' (
iv iii ii i
cG L t G c L F L L G V − − + + − − − = 4 43 4 42 1 43 42 1 4 3 42 1  .
Hence, there are four effects which have to be balanced on the margin. The first two
are marginal changes in "Harberger triangles". (i) is the marginal change of con-
sumption efficiency and (ii) is the marginal change in natives' labor income. (iv) is
marginal waste in tax revenue. Finally, (iii) is the marginal change in tax export, i.e.,
the change in tax revenue paid by non-natives. From the point of view of national
welfare, any reduction in tax export adds to the marginal social cost of tax distortion.
This extended definition is underlying the following discussion. 
The analysis is complicated by the fact that corner solutions cannot be discarded if
welfare is to be maximized. Quite to the contrary, if the Leviathan propensity to waste
tax revenue vanishes, c=0, OP turns out to be optimal. That is, constitutional design
should only target tax efficiency in absence of tax waste. The social cost of distortive
taxation can be minimized only if immigrants are exempted from home taxes. If the17
Leviathan propensity to waste tax revenue is positive, it is less clear, however, whether
OP continues to dominate DI and EP. This may not come as a great surprise given the
results of Edwards/Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000). Still, it is worth stressing. The
following example demonstrates that for sufficiently large c, preference should be
given to EP in a direct comparison with OP.
Example: For 
2 / 1 4G V = , F=2
2 / 1 L ,  * w = 1/4,  0 * = t ,  L=  10, natives' welfare W =
V+F-(L-L )F'-tL  obtains values reported in the following table.




Such a comparison clearly says little about the potential merits of DI. Unfortunately,
the comparison of DI with EP is difficult essentially for the same reasons as it is
difficult between EP and OP. However, a definite comparison between DI and OP is
possible.
Proposition 1: If the Leviathan's propensity, c, to waste tax revenue is positive,
eventually subjecting immigrant labor to home taxation, i.e., implementing DI with  i δ
large but smaller than one, is a better policy than not subjecting immigrant labor to
home taxation and implementing OP. Implementing OP is optimal only for c=0.18
For a proof, just insert (6) - (8) into (9) and make use of V'=1. One then obtains
W'  = -cG'  =  ct(L-L )/GV"  ,
which fails to be positive and proves the proposition. Note that the larger c is, the more
negative W' is and the stronger the case for opting against OP and in favor of DI. The
following figure illustrates why welfare comparisons are difficult if values of  i δ  that
are not close to one are being considered.
When moving from  i δ =1 to some lower value, essentially two effects have to be
traded off in a welfare analysis. One is the social cost of tax distortion and the other is
the social cost of wasteful government. As the former is an effect of second order in 1-
i δ  while the latter an effect of first order, no definite welfare comparison is possible
between low and large values of  i δ  or - expressing the same differently - between
strong and weak tax competition. One can only say that for c>0, some tax competition
( i δ <1) dominates the absence of any tax competition ( i δ =1). 19
The case for DI would be stronger if both mobile and immobile labor could be shown
to benefit when moving from OP to DI. This is, however, not true. Immobile labor
loses, as can easily be demonstrated by means of (6) and (7):






  =  V'G' - LF"L'  >  0 .
There are two reasons why immobile labor loses when introducing tax competition and
moving from OP to DI. First, the supply of the public good decreases and, second,
immobile wage income shrinks when immigrant mobile labor is taxed. The latter
results from the well-known effect that taxes on perfectly mobile factors are shifted
backward to the immobile ones and that such shifting is costly in terms of efficiency.
Propostion 2: Immobile labor loses when moving marginally from OP to DI.
3.2 Natives' support
In the present setting, policy is evaluated by measuring the welfare of natives. Hence,
one may well conjecture that superior results are obtained in terms of welfare if the
Leviathan is forced to seek the support of natives and not that of taxpayers. The scope
for pursuing some selfish policy is constrained if the Leviathan is forced to include the
correct aggregate of labor income in its objective function. Such a conjecture turns out
to be correct.
Assuming that the Leviathan seeks the support of natives, it maximizes cG + V(G) +
N
i X  in G, t, L subject to  L L ≤ , (1i), (2i), and (4i). Consideration is restricted again to20
the analysis of interior solutions,  L L < , 
* * * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' t w t L F i e δ − − > δ − − . The first-
order conditions of the resulting Lagrangean optimization are (1i), (2i), and









2 2  . (10)
Obviously, V'>1 for  i δ <1. That is, consumption of the public good is below the
efficient level except for the case when  i δ =1. It is straightforward to demonstrate that
i δ =1 is a stationary point of the natives' welfare function. Less clear is whether OP
stands for a local maximum or a local minimum of natives' welfare. The following
proposition gives the answer. The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 3: If the Leviathan propensity, c, to waste tax revenue is sufficiently large,
it is not optimal to implement OP. It is better to subject immigrant labor to home
taxation eventually, i.e., to implement DI with  i δ  sufficiently large but smaller than
one. Implementing OP is a local optimum only if c takes on small values or L-L  large
ones, respectively.
Proposition 3 is well in line with Proposition 1. Leviathan activity is shown to provide
an argument against OP and pro DI. At the same time, Proposition 3 is weaker than
Proposition 1. The argument in favor of DI requires some Leviathan propensity to
waste tax revenue which is sufficiently large. This accords well with what has been
conjectured. It helps to tame the Leviathan if natives alone are allowed to vote and
immigrant labor is not.21
4. Optimal delay in the case of emigration
The task of designing the optimal delay in releasing emigrant labor from the liability to
pay home taxes is analyzed along the same lines developed for the case of
immigration. Assuming that the Leviathan seeks the support of taxpayers, it
maximizes cG + V(G) + 
T
e X  in G, t, L subject to  L L ≥ , (1e), (2e), and (3e). Restricting
consideration to interior solutions, L >L, 
* * * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ' t w t L F e i δ − − < δ − − , and
solving for the resulting Lagrangean optimization yields (1e), (2e), and 
) ' )( 1 (
* w F e e δ − δ −   =   [] " ) 1 (
1
' 1 2 F t
c
V




as first-order conditions.  ) ( L L L e e − δ + ≡ Λ  is a short form for the mobile tax base.
As before, efficient consumption of the public good, V'=1, is obtained when OP
( e δ =1) applies. Again, one would like to know how OP compares with DI when  e δ  is
sufficiently large. A clear-cut result is, however, obtained only for the case in which
OP is applied abroad. Assuming 
*
i δ =1, one can show that  e δ =1 is a stationary point of
the welfare function of the home country's natives. In order to see whether it is a local
maximum or minimum, the technique introduced  for the proof of Proposition 3 is
applied. That is, when differentiating (1e), (2e), and (11) implicitly, all terms of second
order in 1- e δ are ignored. Note that this technique allows one to ignore the RHS of
(11). The LHS is of second order in 1- e δ , which follows from inserting 
*
i δ =1 in (1e)
and from noting  ) )( 1 ( '
* * t w w F e e + δ − = δ − . When ignoring terms of second order, the
derivatives of the endogenous variables turn out to be as follows:22
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As in the case of immigration, increasing  e δ  to large values boosts employment at
home and increases the consumption of the public good. The reason is that by
increasing  e δ , the incentive to avoid paying home taxes by emigrating is reduced. The
marginal change in t at  e δ =1, however, differs in sign from the immigration case. The
RHS of (14) is negative, whereas it is positive in (8). Increasing  e δ  to large values thus
makes the Leviathan reduce taxes in the country of emigration, whereas it increases
taxes in the country of immigration. This must be interpreted as saying that the
Leviathan enjoys more strength under conditions of immigration. This interpretation
finds further support with the following welfare analysis.
Assuming 
*
i δ =1, differentiating W=V+
N
e X =V-(1+c)G+F+(L- L )
* w  with respect to
e δ , ignoring second-order terms, and plugging in (12) and (13) yields
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Obviously, the sign of W' is ambiguous. The first term of the bracketed expression is
positive while the second is negative. The larger c is, the larger the latter term
becomes.23
Proposition 4: If the Leviathan's propensity, c, to waste tax revenue is sufficiently
large, it is not optimal to adopt OP. It increases natives' welfare instead if emigrant
labor is eventually released from the liability to pay home taxes. Adopting OP is a
local optimum only if c takes on small values.
As marginal welfare W' vanishes at  e δ =1, there is no efficiency gain to be reaped by a
marginal move towards DI. Setting  e δ  marginally below one results in pure redistri-
bution from immobile to mobile labor. The marginal gain of mobile native labor can
easily be determined by making use of (12) and (14):








= δ 1 ) ' ( .
Hence, the marginal gain equals tax revenue collected from mobile labor employed at
home.
One may wonder how results change if the Leviathan is assumed to seek the support of
natives instead of taxpayers. As it turns out, the changes are only marginal and not
upsetting. All that happens is that the variable 
* w  disappears from the formulas (13) -
(15). As the foreign wage rate 
* w  appears jointly with the factor 1+c, this has to be
interpreted as follows. The effect that selfish government behavior has on marginal
changes in G, t, and W is dampened if the Leviathan's power is checked by a native
electorate. This does not come as much of a surprise given what is already known to
hold for the immigration case. The only difference is that the effect of switching from24
a taxpayers' electorate to a natives' electorate turns out to be less pronounced in the
emigration case.
5. Summary and conclusions
The practice of taxing labor in the country of employment has been questioned in the
literature. The reasons are basically twofold. First, the Employment Principle, EP,
provides strong incentives for choosing employment where taxes are low. This
impedes the efficient allocation of mobile labor and renders non-paretian redistribution
in favor of immobile labor costly. Second, by its very nature, EP is not applicable to
non-active persons such as the recipients of social assistance. Although this has not
been the focus of the present analysis, it is a matter of policy concern in the European
Union (Sakslin, 1997; Council of Economic Advisors, 2001). The reason is that free
movement is an agreed objective in the Union. The Treaty of Maastricht rules that
every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory
of the Member States. At present, this right is effectively limited for non-active
persons, in general, and recipients of social assistance, in particular. However, it is safe
to assume that the limitations will not stand for ever. Free mobility extended to the
recipients of social assistance is an objective for which Europe will have to find a
politically viable solution (Richter, 2002b). No matter what this solution looks like, it
will conflict with EP. 
The policy question is what a good alternative to EP might be. In the literature, the
Principles of Origin, OP, and of Delayed Integration, DI, are handled as potential
alternatives. OP and DI have the obvious advantage of being directly applicable to25
non-active persons. There is even much sense in requiring the country of origin to
support native recipients of social assistance if these persons enjoy their right of free
movement. For a more detailed discussion of such a policy, see Richter (2002b). This
paper is, however, not one on social assistance and its provision to mobile citizens.
The focus is on mobile labor and the question of how OP, DI and EP compare if all
individuals are employed. Unfortunately, a clear-cut ranking is only obtained if
governments can be assumed to act as benevolent planners. In this case, EP is
dominated by DI and the latter by OP in terms of the inflicted social costs of tax
distortion. However, OP eliminates fiscal competition. It provides governments with
the leeway to abuse their fiscal power because taxpayers cannot threaten to avoid
taxation by emigrating. As a result, the incentive for governments to pursue a policy in
the interest of their citizens is weak. EP has more of a disciplinary effect on Leviathan
governments.
However, no clear-cut results can be derived once due allowance is made to selfish
behavior of governments. As this paper demonstrates, it is not clear whether
preference should be given to OP or EP in a model which captures the cost of tax
distortion and the cost of selfish government. Much depends on the Leviathan's
propensity to waste tax revenue. If this propensity is large, OP is dominated by DI
with some sufficiently large delay. Unfortunately, no such strong result could be
derived with regard to the comparison between OP or DI with EP. There is, however,
some weak evidence for the presumption that the case of EP becomes the stronger, the
more the Leviathan is inclined to waste tax revenue.26
Besides this, some noteworthy results are obtained. For example, it was shown that a
regime of emigration exerts more disciplinary power on a Leviathan government than
a regime of immigration. Furthermore, it helps to tame the Leviathan if voting rights
are restricted to natives and not granted to immigrant taxpayers.
The relevance of this paper's analysis is not restricted to the taxation of mobile labor.
The relevance for social security has already become apparent in passing. Whenever
social security does not accord with the Benefit Principle, it either implies implicit
taxation or implicit subsidization of migration. In these cases, there are potential costs
of distorted locational choices and EP has to be put up for discussion. This paper's
relevance, however, goes even further. It extends to other mobile factors such as
capital. Clearly terminology would have to be adapted to such an application. For
example, taxing labor in the country of employment amounts to taxing capital at
source. At least this holds from an analytical and allocational point of view. Similarly,
the effects of taxing labor in the country of origin directly compare to those of taxing
capital according to the Residence Principle. Even DI finds its counterpart in interna-
tional taxation of capital. Applying DI to capital amounts to granting some form of tax
rebate for inflowing capital. In the case of outflowing capital, DI extends home tax
liability for some fixed span of time. In fact, such provisions exist in foreign tax codes,
as has been pointed out before.
The Residence Principle is known to ensure a globally efficient allocation of capital.
This is often said to be an advantage in comparison to the Source Principle. The
argument relies on the production efficiency theorem of Diamond and Mirrless. See
a.o. Frenkel, Razin, and Sadka (1991). It is obvious that DI fails to sustain production27
efficiency. However, as argued by Keen and Wildasin (2000), the case for production
efficiency is not that strong in an international context. It requires the feasibility of
international lump-sum transfers and empirical evidence of this is lacking. This paper
chose to focus on national efficiency and to rule out the possibility of international
lump-sum transfers.
This is by no means the only assumption in need of discussion. The exogenous
division into mobile and immobile labor is critical. In a more general approach, due
allowance would have to be made for the fact that mobility is strongly correlated with
skill and that the acquisition of skill is an endogenous decision. One must be aware
that any policy designed to alleviate the fate of immobile labor may produce severe
distortions. Mobility generates efficiency gains, so that any policy targeted at
immobility tends to be costly in terms of efficiency. As shown by Wildasin (2000),
immobile labor may well benefit indirectly from free mobility if the division into
mobile and immobile labor alone is the outcome of market-oriented rational
investment in human capital and skills.
One may rightly question the small country assumption which has been the basis for
the present analysis. However, one should not expect deep new insights from
extending the analysis to large countries. Clearly, terms-of-trade effects would show
up. A tax on immigrant labor works like a tariff on imports and that may have a
positive income effect of first order. The results obtained in the present paper would
need to be qualified appropriately.
Distributive policy has been modeled as being non-paretian. In other words, taxes
modeled are a pure burden on mobile labor. Again, such an assumption is debatable.28
An alternative would be to derive distributive policy from mobile taxpayer's altruism
(Pauly, 1973). Redistribution would then amount to a public good consumed by
mobile taxpayers. The discussion would need to be qualified appropriately. Taxes are
well-known not to distort locational choices if they can be rationalized by the Benefit
Principle. In fact, taxes need to be levied employment-based if the cost of providing
public goods to a marginal migrant is related to employment and if allocational
efficiency is to be enhanced. This is just what the application of marginal cost pricing
suggests in the case of mobile labor. 
An interesting qualification is made by Hange and Wellisch (1998). In a model of
benevolent first-best welfare maximization, one would have to endow jurisdictions
with the power to balance their public budget without distorting locational choices.
The implication is that jurisdictions should have a tax on fixed factors at their disposal.
As Hange et al. show, quite the contrary is optimal if governments are assumed to
pursue selfish objectives. The idea is that a tax on fixed factors gives the Leviathan
leeway to abuse its power of taxation. Interjurisdictional tax competition does not
exert any restraining force in this case. The Leviathan should only have access to tax
instruments which can be avoided by taxpayers.
Finally, one may rightly question the perfect mobility assumption of which the
analysis made such heavy use. Clearly, perfect mobility lacks realism. There are
moving costs which have to be offset by migrants against income gains. Costs of
mobility are a definite obstacle to the efficient allocation of labor. However, they do
not make the present analysis obsolete. Taxes retain there distortive potential on the
margin even in the presence of moving costs.29
The propensity to move and the distortions exerted by taxes on locational choices raise
a number of empirical questions. They cannot be dealt with adequately at the level of a
footnote. For a comprehensive recent survey - albeit in German - see Feld (2000). See
also Oates 2002. The bottom line to this literature is that the empirical evidence on the
effect that taxes, social benefits, and public goods have on residence choices is
somewhat mixed. In the United States, the recipients of social assistance obviously
strongly respond to the transfer level. In other countries, notably in Switzerland, social
transfers play a less important role. As to taxes, the empirical evidence tends to be
reversed. Local taxes have been shown to have strong effects on residence choices in
Switzerland. This is especially the case for high income earners, who, incidentally,
also react positively to local public expenditures. Low-income earners are not as
strongly influenced by taxes in their choice of residence. In the United States, things
seem to be different, which could be due to the fact that Sates and local authorities are
financed through income taxes only to a minor extent. Hence, from an empirical point
of view, it is not fully clear how important the distorting effects of taxes on migration
are. Still, economic theory suggests not playing them down but rather thinking
carefully about how to assign taxpayers to jurisdictions in a world of increasing
mobility.
6. Appendix
In order to prove Proposition 3, it is necessary to solve (1i), (2i), (10) for G', t', L' as
functions of  i δ  when this parameter takes on values close to one. For such large values
of  i δ , terms of second order in 1- i δ  are dominated by first-order ones. Hence, it is30
possible to restrict attention to the latter terms. An immediate implication is that the
left hand side of (10) can be ignored when computing the Jacobian of (1i), (2i), (10). It
is an expression which quadratically tends to zero for  i δ 1 → . When ignoring terms of
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Plugging such expressions into the marginal welfare function W' yields
W'  =  V'G' - (L-L )F"L'-Lt '
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The first two terms on the RHS are positive while the third is negative. Proposition 3 is
obtained after signing the RHS.
References
Brennan, G. and J.M. Buchanan, 1980, The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a
Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge/Mass.
Council of Economic Advisors to the Ministry of Finance, 2001, Freizügigkeit und
soziale Sicherung in Europa (Free Movement and Social Security in Europe),
Schriftenreihe des BMF, Heft 69, Stollfuß Verlag, Bonn.
Diamond, P.A. and J.A. Mirrless, 1971, Optimal Taxation and Public Production,
American Economic Review 111, 8-27 and 261-278.
Edwards, J. and M. Keen, 1996, Tax Competition and Leviathan, European Economic
Review 40, 113-134.
Feld, L.P. 2000, Steuerwettbewerb und seine Auswirkungen auf Allokation und
Distribution (Tax Competition and its Effects on Allocation and Distribution),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.
Frenkel, J.A., A. Razin, and E. Sadka, 1991, International Taxation in an Integrated
World, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Hange, U., and D. Wellisch, 1998, The Benefit of Fiscal Decentralization, Finanz-
Archiv 55, 315-327.
Keen, M., and D.E. Wildasin, 2000, Pareto Efficiency in International Taxation,
CESifo Working Paper No. 371.
Michel, Ph., P. Pestieau and J.-P. Vidal, 1998, Labor Migration and Redistribution
with Alternative Assimilation Policies: The Small Economy Case, Regional
Science and Urban Economics 28, 363-377.
Oates, W.E., 2002, Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence, forth-
coming in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik.
Pauly, M.V., 1973, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, Journal of Public
Economics 2, 35-58.
Rauscher, M., 2000, Interjurisdictional Competition and Public-Sector Prodigality:
The Triumph of the Market over the State? FinanzArchiv 57, 89-105.
Razin, A., and E. Sadka, 2001, Labor, Capital, and Finance, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK32
Richter, W.F., 2002, Delayed Integration of Mobile Labor: A Principle for Coor-
dinating Taxation, Social Security, and Social Assistance, forthcoming
Richter, W.F., 2002, Social Security and Taxation of Labour Subject to Subsidiarity
and Freedom of Movement, forthcoming in: Swedish Economic Policy Review.
Sakslin, M., 1997, Can the Principles of the Nordic Conventions on Social Protection
Contribute to the Modernisation and Simplification of Regulation (EEC) No.
1408/71?, in: 25 Years of Regulation (EEC) No. 1408/71 on Social Security for
Migrant Workers, Swedish National Social Insurance Board, ed., Stockholm,
199-227.
Sinn, H.-W., 1994, How Much Europe? Subsidiarity, Centralization and Fiscal Com-
petition, Scottish Journal of Political Economy 41, 85-107.
Weichenrieder, A., 2000, A Simple Rule for Taxing the Mobile Rich, mimeo, Univer-
sity of Munich.
Wildasin, D.E., 2000, Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital,
and Fiscal Competition, American Economic Review 90, 73-95.    CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
________________________________________________________________________
735  Sandro Brusco and Fausto Panunzi, Reallocation of Corporate Resources and
Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets, May 2002
736  Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, Strategic Power Revisited, May 2002
737  Martin W. Cripps, Godfrey Keller, and Sven Rady, Strategic Experimentation: The
Case of Poisson Bandits, May 2002
738  Pierre André Chiappori and Bernard Salanié, Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of
Some Recent Work, June 2002
739  Robert J. Gary-Bobo and Sophie Larribeau, A Structural Econometric Model of Price
Discrimination in the Mortgage Lending Industry, June 2002
740  Laurent Linnemer, When Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm Improves Welfare,
June 2002
741  Gebhard Kirchgässner and Friedrich Schneider, On the Political Economy of
Environmental Policy, June 2002
742  Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Start-ups, Venture Capitalits, and the
Capital Gains Tax, June 2002
743  Robert Fenge, Silke Uebelmesser, and Martin Werding, Second-best Properties of
Implicit Social Security Taxes: Theory and Evidence, June 2002
744  Wendell Fleming and Jerome Stein, Stochastic Optimal Control, International Finance
and Debt, June 2002
745  Gene M. Grossman, The Distribution of Talent and the Pattern and Consequences of
International Trade, June 2002
746  Oleksiy Ivaschenko, Growth and Inequality: Evidence from Transitional Economies,
June 2002
747  Burkhard Heer, Should Unemployment Benefits be Related to Previous Earnings?, July
2002
748  Bas van Aarle, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Jacob Engwerda, and Joseph Plasmans,
Staying Together or Breaking Apart: Policy-makers’ Endogenous Coalitions Formation
in the European Economic and Monetary Union, July 2002
749  Hans Gersbach, Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda
Costs, July 2002
750  Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both?, July 2002751  Jonas Agell and Helge Bennmarker, Wage Policy and Endogenous Wage Rigidity: A
Representative View From the Inside, July 2002
752  Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies, July 2002
753  Rebecca M. Blank, U.S. Welfare Reform: What’s Relevant for Europe?, July 2002
754  Ruslan Lukach and Joseph Plasmans, Measuring Knowledge Spillovers Using Patent
Citations: Evidence from the Belgian Firm’s Data, July 2002
755  Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, Boom-Bust Cycles in Middle Income Countries:
Facts and Explanation, July 2002
756  Jan K. Brueckner, Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis, July
2002
757  Lawrence M. Kahn, The Impact of Wage-Setting Institutions on the Incidence of Public
Employment in the OECD: 1960-98, July 2002
758  Sijbren Cnossen, Tax Policy in the European Union, August 2002
759  Chandima Mendis, External Shocks and Banking Crises in Developing Countries: Does
the Exchange Rate Regime Matter?, August 2002
760  Bruno S. Frey and Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical
Analysis, August 2002
761  Lars Calmfors and Åsa Johansson, Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and
Monetary Union, August 2002
762  Alexander R. W. Robson and Stergios Skaperdas, Costly Enforcement of Property
Rights and the Coase Theorem, August 2002
763  Horst Raff, Preferential Trade Agreements and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct
Investment, August 2002
764  Alex Cukierman and V. Anton Muscatelli, Do Central Banks have Precautionary
Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability? – Theory and Evidence, August 2002
765  Giovanni Peri, Knowledge Flows and Knowledge Externalities, August 2002
766  Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh, Equilibrium Vengeance, August 2002
767  Sam Bucovetsky and Michael Smart, The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue
Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions, August 2002
768  Tapio Palokangas, International Labour Market Regulation and Economic Growth with
Creative Destruction, August 2002
769  Rudi Dornbusch, The New International Architecture, September 2002770  Hans-Werner Sinn, Weber’s Law and the Biological Evolution of Risk Preferences: The
Selective Dominance of the Logarithmic Utility Function, September 2002
771  Thomas Mayer, The Macroeconomic Loss Function: A Critical Note, September 2002
772  Seppo Honkapohja and Kaushik Mitra, Learning Stability in Economies with
Heterogenous Agents, September 2002
773  David Laidler, Inflation Targets Versus International Monetary Integration – A
Canadian Perspective, September 2002
774  Morten I. Lau, Panu Poutvaara, and Andreas Wagener, The Dynamic Cost of the Draft,
September 2002
775  Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Charles van Marrewijk, Locational Competition
and Agglomeration: The Role of Government Spending, September 2002
776  Anke S. Kessler and Christoph Lülfesmann, The Theory of Human Capital Revisited:
On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments, September 2002
777  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Lars Sørgard, Unionized Oligopoly, Trade
Liberalization and Location Choice, September 2002
778  Antonio Merlo and François Ortalo-Magné, Bargaining over Residential Real Estate:
Evidence from England, September 2002
779  Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Labour Market
Adjustment under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, September 2002
780  Michael S. Michael, International Migration, Income Taxes and Transfers: A Welfare
Analysis, September 2002
781  Clemens Fuest and Alfons Weichenrieder, Tax Competition and Profit Shifting: On the
Relationship between Personal and Corporate Tax Rates, October 2002
782  Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse, Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An
Example from the Banking Industry, October 2002
783  Johann K. Brunner and Susanne Pech, Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market with
Sequential and Simultaneous Insurance Demand, October 2002
784  Gregory D. Hess and Eduard Pelz, The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An
Empirical Assessment, October 2002
785  Jan Erik Askildsen, Uwe Jirjahn, and Stephen C. Smith, Works Councils and
Environmental Investment: Theory and Evidence from German Panel Data, October
2002
786  Geir H. Bjønnes, Dagfinn Rime, and Haakon O. Aa. Solheim, Volume and Volatility in
the FX-Market: Does it matter who you are?, October 2002787  John Evans and John Fingleton, Entry Regulation and the Influence of an Incumbent
Special Interest Group, October 2002
788  Wolfgang Ochel, International Comparisons and Transfer of Labour Market
Institutions, October 2002
789  B. Gabriela Mundaca, Moral Hazard Effects of Bailing out under Asymmetric
Information, October 2002
790  Gene M. Grossman and Edwin L.-C. Lai, International Protection of Intellectual
Property, October 2002
791  John Hassler, José V. Rodriguez Mora, Kjetil Storesletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, A
Positive Theory of Geographic Mobility and Social Insurance, October 2002
792  Paul De Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi, The Exchange Rate in a Model with
Heterogeneous Agents and Transactions Costs, October 2002
793  Guido Friebel and Mariassunta Giannetti, Fighting for Talent: Risk-shifting, Corporate
Volatility, and Organizational Change, October 2002
794  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi, and Tor Helge Holmås, Will Increased Wages
Reduce Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis of Nurses’ Labour Supply, October
2002
795  Marko Köthenbürger and Panu Poutvaara, Social Security Reform and Intergenerational
Trade: Is there Scope for a Pareto-Improvement?, October 2002
796  Paul De Grauwe and Laura Rinaldi, A Model of the Card Payment System and the
Interchange Fee, October 2002
797  Volker Böhm and Tomoo Kikuchi, Dynamics of Endogenous Business Cycles and
Exchange Rate Volatility, October 2002
798  Mariam Camarero, Javier Ordóñez, and Cecilio Tamarit, The Euro-Dollar Exchange
Rate: Is it Fundamental?, October 2002
799  Misa Tanaka, How Do Bank Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulation Affect the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism?, October 2002
800  Jörg Baten and Andrea Wagner, Autarchy, Market Disintegration, and Health: The
Mortality and Nutritional Crisis in Nazi Germany, 1933-1937, October 2002
801  Saku Aura, Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital
Bargaining, October 2002
802  Wolfram F. Richter, Delaying Integration of Immigrant Labor for the Purpose of
Taxation, October 2002